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Introduction
This chapter discusses communications policy models and advanced Internet services,
such as Internet telephony.1 Pricing and cost issues arising from Internet telephony services are
briefly addressed. In particular, this chapter provides a theoretical framework to define the
desirable contours of a communications policy model for the Internet and all media, and
describes, as an example of what is needed, the features and attributes of a new intermediary
institution, the Internet Telephony Consortium (ITC). In McKnight (1989), such an impermanent
intermediary institution was defined as an ad hoc, corporatist organization. This chapter
concludes that an Open Communications Policy framework, as described by Neuman, McKnight,
and Solomon (1997), is consistent with the technology and economics of the Internet, which
relies heavily on ad hoc, corporatist, intermediary organizations for standards-setting and other
governance functions. Both new pricing strategies and a supportive policy framework are needed
for Internet telephony services to recover costs and to integrate successfully the Internet and
telecommunications industries for the benefit of customers and suppliers.
The Internet Telephony Consortium’s work on Internet policy has benefited from cross-
industry collaboration and has been informed in part by an Internet telephony cost model
developed by ITC Research Assistant Brett Leida. Leida’s thesis (1998), as well as other papers
(McKnight and Leida 1997), analyze the costs and trade-offs for an Internet Service Provider to
support such services as Internet voice and multimedia conferencing. Costs for the provision of
Internet telephony services are concentrated in the modem banks and transport services of the
ISP. However, in addition to these technical items, items such as customer service, sales, and
marketing still represent a substantial portion of an ISP’s costs with Internet telephony. This
work on Internet Service Provider costs is summarized in this chapter.
Pricing and industrial structure questions have motivated further inquiry within the
Internet Telephony Consortium (Clark 1997a, Clark 1997b, Lehr 1997). Pricing models
supporting Internet voice services might be employed for pricing other Internet integrated and
differentiated services. The policy implications are that a convergent regulatory framework will
be required to formulate policies for multimedia services, which would not distort the prices for
those services. It would be desirable if government policymakers could study and understand
these issues and develop appropriate policies without introducing economic and technical
distortions into the nascent Internet telephony market.
Internet Telephony
Initially, Internet telephony developed to provide interactive voice communications over
the existing IP-based Internet. The process required the use of personal computers (PCs) with the
same application software running on both the originating and receiving computers.2 Both PCs
needed to be connected to Internet Service Providers (ISPs) and equipped with a sound card
(multimedia-enabled), a microphone, and speakers. This form of connectivity using PCs was the
primary focus for the first stage of development of Internet telephony technology. The extension
of PC connectivity from a single network across the Internet was the greatest advantage made
possible through the early application of Internet telephony technology. Access to advanced
integrated services, as well as access to services enabling interworking across the Public
Switched Telephone Network (PSTN) to and from the Internet, is still at an early stage, due to
limited bandwidth, processing power, service development, and interoperability.
The development of voice communication capabilities, using the Internet protocol (IP)
over the Internet, has progressed to where these capabilities may be viewed more accurately as IP
telephony than as Internet telephony. IP telephony capabilities are now becoming widespread.
The limitations of the circuit-switching techniques of conventional telephony may now be
overcome through integration with IP technologies. The areas IP telephony address include:
delivery of incoming calls from the Internet to existing call centers, provision of virtual office
capabilities for at-home workers (telecommuters), provision of mobile desk-top capabilities for
traveling employees, multimedia-enabling of enterprise Wide Area Networks, and the
provisioning of cost efficient disaster recovery plans.
A key element in making effective use of the emerging IP telephony technology is the
development and use of gateways that bridge the IP environment of the Internet and the circuit-
switched environment of the public telecommunications network. Such gateways are devices that
make it possible to construct application-specific network structures that provide for real-time,
two-way communication between circuit-switching and packet-switching technologies to create
an integrated, networking fabric. Enabling interoperability between the public
telecommunications network and the Internet, as can be done with gateways, is one of the
original objectives in the formation of the ITC.
The public Internet is not a controlled network environment. The IP technology currently
employed on the Internet uses non-deterministic switching (datagrams), which offers little
potential for approximating real-time voice connectivity in that environment, except through
overprovisioning of bandwidth. As a consequence, Internet telephony over the public Internet is
not, as yet, a significant direct competitor in the field of voice telephony. However, using IP
networks, either conceived as Intranets or Virtual Private Networks, to provide voice services
across a well-managed, over-provisioned, best-effort network, is technically feasible today.  In
fact, entrepreneurs and established businesses large and small are beginning to use IP
technologies in just this fashion.  Typically, the end user or customer may not know or care that
her voice was carried across a packet network rather than across a circuit-switched network along
a portion of its transmission path.
INTERNET TELEPHONY REQUIREMENTS.
Definition, Mechanisms, and Regulation or Self-Regulation of:
• authentication and certification
 
• network management
• billing • performance measurement
• customer service • Quality of Service (QoS)
• emergency messaging • security
• liability and fraud • signaling
Table 1.  Internet Telephony Requirements.
Internet Telephony and Regulation
Internet telephony's initial market niche was as a consumer-related “Chat” product,
possessing an appeal similar to that of amateur (HAM) radio, with broader accessibility. Internet
telephony software is available to anyone who wishes to purchase and use it. However, the
deployment of gateways has been relatively limited to date. The most immediate potential for
gateways lies in the expansion of commerce by providing direct and immediate access from the
World Wide Web to existing businesses that operate in the PSTN (public-switched telephone
network) environment.
The near-term value of Internet telephony resides in private intranets and in the provision
of value-added services for circuit-switched networks. The use of gateways in applications where
the non-real-time characteristics of Internet telephony are adequate would be severely limited by
premature regulation of ill-defined Internet telephony services. Furthermore, premature
regulations could limit the introduction of IP-based enhancements to public networks. Regulation
could also slow the development of new networks to support a full range of multimedia
communications across heterogeneous networks.
Internet telephony is at a point where it can be compared favorably to traditional voice
telephony for serving potential customers on the Web, and in fact, can offer higher quality
services to discriminating audio consumers. Nonetheless, both the technology and the market for
Internet telephony are immature and require further development to reach their potential.
Regulation of Internet telephony could hinder innovation. Regulation by individual nations
would likely cause only their domestic telecommunications industry to suffer, as the industry in
other states embraces and develops Internet telephony. Additionally, even if Internet telephony
were to be regulated, voice over the Internet may still be used by some alternative technological
method. Premature regulation of Internet telephony would be an ineffective and inappropriate
response to this developing technology and market.3
Further development of Internet telephony threatens the telecommunications industry, as
it is an emerging competitive alternative to the traditional voice telephony market. In such a
competitive state, both industries must innovate to remain competitive. Competition between
traditional and Internet telephony will accelerate the move toward cost-based tariffs. In the many
countries where tariff rebalancing is just beginning or still underway, this may be of greater
importance to consumers than anything else about Internet telephony—at least until advanced
Internet services become widely available. With the trend of deregulation and the opening of
telecommunication markets to competition, it is inappropriate to advocate increased regulation of
the Internet. By allowing continued innovation and development of Internet telephony, a true
alternative to traditional voice telephony and a more competitive market are closer to realization.
Constraints placed on the development of Internet telephony would only stifle innovation in
Internet telephony technology and applications, as well as potentially stifle innovation in
traditional telephony as well.4
The Internet and Open Communications Policy
The Internet is a network of networks using public protocols to share resources and
economic benefits. Having arisen outside the realm of broadcast, telecommunications or print
media, the Internet has effectively resisted classification and regulation within the models of
other media and services. National regulators, political authorities, international agencies, and
multinational firms from a variety of industries have all sought to control the Internet. All have
failed. Seemingly, the Internet is a new species of technical-economic-political activity—self-
organizing and self-governing; truly existing only in the minds of its users due to their choice to
receive and send messages, using its language and methods. The Internet’s seemingly
mysterious, self-governing and fluidly reorganizing capabilities are not unique, however.  Other
entities, such as expert commissions, standards organizations and public-private research
consortia, exhibit similar qualities and possess comparable strengths and weaknesses (McKnight
1989, McKnight and Neuman 1995).
As the Internet evolves, it reaches ever more deeply into the broadcast,
telecommunications, computing, and publishing industries, to name a few. The display of Web
site addresses by advertisers in broadcasts, cable and satellite TV, as well as in print publications,
were only the first demonstrations of the Internet's interpenetration of other media.
With the Internet acting as "change agent," the collapse of the old regulatory models is
inevitable. In their place, more flexible government programs monitoring the information and
communications technology and services markets are needed. In addition, continued support of
research, education, and the provision of information access to targeted disadvantaged users is
socially justifiable and supports the continued provision of a new public good—the Internet.
The international implications of the communications policy transformation underway
that is attributable to the growth of the Internet is profound. The notion that the Internet is
intrinsically border-less and outside the control of national governments is false. Especially with
the growth of new naming and numbering schemes for intellectual property protection, taxation,
and directory services, as well as provisions for varying qualities of service, there are several
levels of influence that governments may exert over Internet users. This leaves aside, for the
moment, the issue of personal privacy, data protection, and information security for Internet
commerce. In particular, debates about government roles and private sector needs with regard to
encryption are beyond the scope of this chapter (McKnight 1997). This controversial area of
international communications policy does not yet seem ripe for resolution, given the conflicting
views of much of the private sector, many users, and the federal government—in particular, the
FBI and NSA.
Despite these caveats and qualifications, the Internet eventually will have an equally
profound impact on national communications policy in many other nations. The Internet
Telephony Consortium is playing a role globally, by helping educate governments, industry, and
users about the potential and the limits of the Internet and advanced Internet services such as
Internet telephony, as the Internet and telecommunications industry continue their convergence.
Communications policy for information infrastructure that ignores the lessons of the
Internet model is unlikely to succeed. Internet technology was created by agile government
technology policy programs, while the Internet, as a communications and interaction
environment, is a key infrastructure for virtual governance (McKnight and Neuman 1995). The
Internet model is used increasingly by standards organizations, but also by distributed
"organizations" (often, communities of interest). The consensual nature of most interactions on
the Internet is important in facilitating ad hoc, corporatist governance of the information
infrastructure.
The principles of ad hoc, corporatist governance can guide policymakers, industry, and
academia in structuring communications policy so that it serves national interests in economic
growth and job creation, as well as supports democratic discourse and social interaction. The
principles are compatible with and supportive of an information or networked society. The
features of ad hoc, corporatist organizations allow them to process, analyze, and sort an
exploding information base which is beyond the ability of any individual, firm, or government
body to understand in all its facets. The growing number of business alliances, joint ventures,
consortia, and networks is a result of this factor (McKnight 1989). Impermanent, agile networks
of industry, government, and academia created through these processes are at work in the United
States, Europe, Japan, and elsewhere. They operate in a sea of public discourse and debate, and
rely increasingly on the Internet as a communications backbone. The International Engineering
Task Force (IETF) may be conceptualized as an ad hoc, corporatist organization whose mission
is to support and integrate the results of pre-competitive, generic research and development of
Internet protocols. The principles of ad hoc corporatism are:
1)  Create impermanent, publicly sanctioned organizations to develop and implement
public policy.
2)  Cross institutional boundaries.
3)  Employ interdisciplinary teams to analyze problems, identify opportunities, and
assess outcomes.
Source:  McKnight (1989).
An open communications policy combines the diversity and dynamism of American
cultural values with a coordination and planning mechanism that serves to strengthen industry
and improve government performance. U.S. communications policy should take cognizance of
the attributes of ad hoc, corporatist policy processes to improve flexibility, accelerate decision-
making, reduce risks, and share costs.5 Any technology and industrial policy, whether for
communications markets or other sectors, that does not possess these attributes is ultimately
doomed to failure.
The U.S. benefits from years of accumulated experience with the Internet. New industries
which conduct business on the Internet are beginning to emerge. For example, electronic
publishing is providing ample information at low cost and in digital format. The cost of
information lies not in the creation of content, but in the storage and efficient delivery—in
essence, the cost of paper, printing, trucks, warehouses, and other physical distribution
mechanisms, plus the cost of personnel. The Internet demonstrates that electronic networks can
reduce delivery costs by orders of magnitude.
An Internet-centric model of policy development, i.e. one that relies on voluntary
cooperation of autonomous agents to achieve goals defined through interaction, is admittedly
imperfect. However, the alternatives, fetishizing or embracing proprietary models of network
design, are fatally flawed. Communications policymakers must recognize the critical features of
the global information economy and fashion policy instruments suited to networked firms and
the principles of ad hoc, corporatist policymaking. The central tenets of an Open
Communications Policy are listed in Table 2 below. Given technological convergence, it is
necessary that the policy framework for communications also converges along the lines
identified—distinctions between wired and wireless, local and long distance—are artifacts from
the past.
OPEN COMMUNICATIONS POLICY
• Fully competitive provision of all communication services
• No regulatory distinctions between:
• Wireline and Wireless
• Narrowband and Broadband
• Broadcast and Switched Service
• Content and Conduit
Table 2.  Central tenets of OCP. (Source: Neuman, McKnight, and Solomon 1997).
Internet Telephony Pricing
This chapter has argued against premature regulation of Internet telephony and for an ad
hoc, corporatist approach to an Open Communications Policy framework.  If the reader accepts
all my arguments up to this point, the question of the market viability and, in particular, the
pricing of Internet telephony and other Internet integrated and differentiated services remains.
Internet service providers face increased costs due to Internet telephony. Whether this is
viewed as a concern for regulators or businessmen, understanding the costs involved in service
provision and further, the costs which may be attributed specifically to regulatory requirements
(e.g., access charges) should be understood. In a comparison of an ISP offering Internet
telephony services to an otherwise identical firm which doesn’t, costs in all categories increase;
however, some categories are affected more than others. The bottom line for an ISP is that
revenues will increase slightly, while costs will almost double with only a moderate use of
Internet telephony (McKnight and Leida 1997). Hence, Internet telephony service providers
(ITSPs) need to consider how to minimize the cost impact of Internet telephony and/or how to
gain additional revenue to operate at profitable levels. A variety of approaches to the pricing of
Internet services have been proposed (McKnight and Bailey 1997; MacKie-Mason and Varian
1997; Clark 1997a; Paschalidis, Tsitsiklis, and Kavassalis 1997). It is as yet unclear, however,
which is preferable in practice.
For ISPs to remain in business, they eventually will need to recover these increased costs
through tiered pricing, a higher flat price, or other mechanisms such as advertising or transaction
fees. The Resource ReSerVation Protocol (RSVP) developed by the Internet Engineering Task
Force (IETF) could be used as one mechanism for implementation of usage-sensitive pricing to
recover those costs. However, whether and where the current specification and its guaranteed
service and controlled load variants is useful has not yet been determined. It is clear that RSVP
by itself is not capable of resolving the host of network architecture and Quality of Service
constraints on Internet pricing models. For example, how RSVP traffic could cross multiple
networks has not been resolved.
When developing pricing schemes, service providers will have to look beyond the
Internet telephony service and consider how to price integrated Internet services, one of which is
Internet telephony. Additionally, an integrated regulatory framework will be required to permit
the provision of such integrated services. In Bailey and McKnight (1997), a variety of proposed
approaches to Internet pricing, including flat-rate, tiered, and usage-sensitive, as well as
approaches at the infrastructure level for network interconnection, are presented.
Experimentation with a variety of pricing models that permit service guarantees for
multiple qualities of service, including guarantees for both real-time multimedia and multicast
conferencing may lead to increased understanding of what features Internet services are valued
by consumers (Varaiya, Edell, and Chand 1996). Additionally, one must consider the state of
technology when considering cost-recovery alternatives. Usage-sensitive pricing will not be an
option until protocols and systems that monitor the use of Internet telephony are developed and
deployed.
The Internet Telephony Consortium and Communications Policy Processes
There are a wide variety of policy issues raised by Internet telephony in particular and
integrated Internet services in general. The ad hoc, corporatist policy processes in which the ITC
engages is demonstrated by examples of its research results which have been communicated to
the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), European Union (EU), and International
Telecommunication Union (ITU) during its first years of existence. Its parallel interactions with
technical standards bodies and its role as an intermediary for firms from a variety of industries
should also be noted. Here, we focus particularly on a quantitative estimate of the costs for
Internet telephony service providers. Additionally, we touch briefly upon the regulatory
discussions surrounding Internet telephony within the European Union.
Access Charges
The Internet telephony scenario described below represents a case in which moderate use
of Internet telephony creates a large cost increase to an ISP. For comparative purposes, one might
wonder how other changing factors would affect an ISP’s costs. One such factor is the Federal
Communications Commission’s (FCC) recent revamping of access charge rules (1997a, 1997b,
1997c, 1996). Under the new rules, ISPs will see an increase in cost of their analog dial-in lines.6
Two principal changes cause this increase: an increased subscriber line charge (SLC) and the pre-
subscribed interexchange carrier charge (PICC). The SLC rose from a cap of $5.60 per-line, per-
month to $9.00 on January 1, 1998 (although few local exchange carriers, LECs, will be able to
charge as high as the cap, the average has been calculated to be $7.61). The PICC increases from
$0.53 to $2.75 per-line, per-month. Using the average charges, the impact on ISPs (or any multi-
line business) will be a $4.23 per-month increase for each analog line.7 Inserting these updated
costs into the ISP cost model, previously developed by the Internet Telephony Consortium,
yields an increase for the analog dial-in subscribers’ cost for both the baseline and Internet
telephony (IT) scenarios.
Table 3 shows the initial results for the two scenarios compared to the results for the two
scenarios with the access reform, calculated on a per-subscriber basis.
BASELINE BASELINE W/
ACCESS REFORM
IT IT W/ ACCESS
REFORM
Capital Equipment $2.70 $2.70 $3.90 $3.90
Transport $2.98 $3.44 $7.72 $8.37
Customer Service $7.50 $7.50 $10.80 $10.80
Operations $3.07 $3.07 $3.26 $3.26
Other Expenses $6.52 $6.57 $7.73 $7.78
Total $22.77 $23.27 $33.42 $34.12
Table 3.  Analog Dial-in Subscriber Costs for 4 Scenarios.
Note that while cost increases due to access reform, this increase is minor in comparison to the
potential increase due to Internet telephony. While no cost increase is advantageous to ISPs, the
recent FCC actions should be considered much less threatening than the potential impact of
Internet telephony, as of the broader impact of, for example, the imposition of universal service
charges on ISPs in addition to on the lines they purchase from Local Exchange Carriers (LECs).
A principal conclusion that one reaches based on these cost results is that ISPs need either to
prevent widespread use of Internet telephony, or to change the current pricing structure of
Internet access services in order to recover the increased costs. What other actions the FCC may
take with regard to Internet telephony are unclear, though a ruling with regard to the ACTA
petition of 1996 is said to be imminent.
European Internet Telephony Policymaking
As we have noted above, perhaps the greatest challenge for Internet telephony is how it
will be treated by governments. The Internet is indeed growing in importance in the United
States, and therefore has been focused on at the highest levels of the U.S. government—more
than in most other nations. However, it would be a mistake to ignore regulatory dilemmas and
proposed approaches arising elsewhere. In particular, the European Commission's approach to
determine policy for Internet telephony merits attention, because of the obvious impact such
policies may have in enabling or inhibiting the continued growth of a worldwide market for
advanced Internet services.
Heterogeneity has been a key characteristic of the Internet from its beginning. The
question of how much heterogeneity in Internet policy is tolerable for various classes of service
will soon be answered in practice by policymakers and Internet users. As discussed by Short
(1997), the European Commission (1997) has established several criteria that Internet telephony
must meet before it will be subject to regulation. These criteria are presented in Table 4.
Such communications are subject of a commercial offer.
Such communications are provided for the public.
Such communications are to and from the public switched network termination
points on a fixed telephony network.
Such communications involve direct transport and switching of speech in real-time.
      Table 4.  EU Criteria for Voice Telephony.
Based on these criteria, Internet telephony is not as yet considered voice telephony
because Internet telephony does not meet the criterion of "real-time" communication, due to the
current, high levels of delay experienced by Internet telephony users on the public Internet.8
Hence, Internet telephony services in Europe are not subject to regulation at this time. How long
"this time" will last is open to speculation.
Conclusions
Internet telephony service providers confront a variety of challenges. The costs, the
technologies, the pricing models, and the policy environment for Internet telephony are all
unsettled and in a state of rapid evolution. To date, a relatively hands-off policy approach has
been taken by the FCC (Werbach 1997) and the White House in the U.S. A similar policy
position has been taken by the European Union. In spite of misguided efforts in some countries
to ban Internet telephony, we believe the real challenge is how to align the costs, technologies,
prices, and policies to enable a rich new class of integrated and differentiated Internet services to
flourish, subsequently bringing substantial benefits to consumers. An Open Communications
Policy model, supported by ad hoc, corporatist technology and policy intermediaries, is best
suited to this task.
The ITSP cost model, developed by the Internet Telephony Consortium (ITC), of Internet
telephony service providers places the ITSP’s costs into five categories: capital equipment,
transport, customer service, operations, and other expenses (sales/marketing and
general/administrative) (Leida 1998; McKnight and Leida 1997). This work shows that even a
moderate use of Internet telephony causes total ISP costs to almost double while revenues
increase only slightly. This paper and the further work to be found on the ITC’s web pages9 may
help policymakers and the convergent Internet and telecommunications industries evolve toward
a sustainable industry structure and stable regulatory environment. Assisting regulators, users,
and policy analysts in understanding what Internet telephony is and is not will help facilitate the
development of a market for Internet telephony and other Internet integrated and differentiated
services. An Open Communications Policy model for the Internet and other media, as argued for
here and in The Gordian Knot, is the most suitable framework for integrated policy development
for convergent services such as Internet telephony.
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